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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103G). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Rahofy has identified eight issues in her "Statement of Issues" for this Court to 
consider during this appeal. As framed, the questions inaccurately characterize the proper 
questions before this Court on appeal. As more fully set forth in the Argument section of this 
brief, the correct questions presented for review are: 
1. Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion when it ruled that 
Defendants appropriately sought to obtain Plaintiffs medical and employment records? 
2. Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in ordering Plaintiff to sign 
releases authorizing Defendant to obtain medical and employment records, when the majority 
of Plaintiff s health care providers and employers are beyond the jurisdiction of Utah courts? 
3. Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in providing a procedure (in 
camera review) whereby Plaintiffs claim of continuing privilege and/or relevancy could be 
independently examined and evaluated? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for factual determinations by a trial court in an order granting 
a motion to compel discovery is abuse of discretion. Askew v. Hardman. 918 P.2d 469,472 
(Utah 1996). 
v i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This lawsuit arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 7, 2005 
in Cedar City, Utah. R. 4. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of the state 
of Illinois. R. 4. 
Although Plaintiff claims significant personal injury and financial damages from the 
accident, Plaintiff has refused to sign authorizations which would allow Defendants to obtain 
copies of the medical/employment records for services prior to the date of the accident, out 
of the state of Utah. R. 70-72. 
The trial Court issued its order compelling Plaintiff to sign authorizations to obtain 
employment records. R. 174-176. 
The trial Court also ordered Plaintiff to provide a complete and detailed list of each 
medical provider who had rendered treatment to Plaintiff (before and after the accident) and 
to sign authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain those records. However, if Plaintiff 
claimed that certain, specific medical records were not relevant to the claims asserted by 
Plaintiff (or were protected by a privilege), the trial Court provided a process whereby she 
could identify the specific medical records to which she claimed privilege or relevancy 
objection. If, after appropriately identifying such records and setting forth the basis for the 
objection, Defendants still wanted to obtain the records, Plaintiff would submit the records 
to the trial Court for in camera review and the trial Court would determine if the records 
would be produced to Defendants. R. 174-176. 
Plaintiff appeals the Court's order on Defendants' Motion to Compel. 
v i i 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts 
On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures which disclosed that 
Plaintiff was then living in Fredericksburg, Virginia, identified witnesses to the claims of 
Plaintiff, and identified physicians who had treated Plaintiff following the accident 
(including physicians in Utah and California). The Initial Disclosures disclosed medical bills 
which Plaintiff claims were incurred as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. R. 
25-28. The Initial Disclosures referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" performed 
by Stuart W. King, MD. (claiming a 20% whole person impairment rating) and an 
"Evaluation of Economic Losses" prepared by Dr. Paul H. Randle (claiming economic losses 
of $724,000). R. 26-27. 
On or about January 24, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff, seeking information regarding Plaintiffs employment 
history and prior medical history. R. 34-37. 
On or about May 3, 2008 Plaintiff filed her discovery responses. R. 38-39. In her 
response, Plaintiff listed 25 places of employment - 17 of these employers had employed 
Plaintiff since 2001. Plaintiff did not provide the address of the employers. All of the 
employers were outside of the state of Utah. R. 105 - 106. 
Plaintiff identified five health care providers who had rendered treatment to Plaintiff 
prior to the subject accident. R. 104. These health care providers are located in Illinois and 
Virginia. R. 104. The responses to the Interrogatories identified a "primary care physician" 
("for the past 25 years"), a chiropractor (who provided chiropractic care in 1994 for sports 
v i i i 
related injury to Plaintiffs back), and three health care providers who purportedly rendered 
gynecological and obstetric care to Plaintiff. R. 104. 
On May 8, 2008, Defendants requested the addresses of Plaintiff s employers and 
requested Plaintiff to execute authorizations (since the individuals and/or entities are not 
within the State of Utah and are not subject to subpoena power of Utah courts) for the release 
of medical and employment records. R. 71. 
On May 14, 2008, Plaintiff responded that she declined to sign the authorizations for 
release of employment and medical records. R. 72. 
On May 21,2008, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed authorizations for 
release of employment and medical records. R. 72. 
Due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the employment/medical records 
authorizations, on August 13, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel asking the trial 
court to order Plaintiff to sign the releases. R. 66-68. 
On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was 
scheduled by the trial Court. R. 152. At the time set for the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff and 
Defendant advised the trial Court that a possible compromise may have been reached 
whereby either the trial court or a third party, (who was to be agreed upon by counsel) would 
determine which medical records and employment records are relevant to the case and 
subject to production to Defendant. The parameters to determine relevance would be 
determined by counsel. However, since the possible compromise was still contingent on the 
reaching agreement on specific issues, the trial Court ordered if a settlement could not be 
i x 
reached on the Motion to Compel, counsel could request a hearing on the Motion to Compel 
or could submit the Motion to Compel for decision. R. 158. 
Subsequent to the December 8, 2008 hearing, the parties were unable to reach a 
stipulation regarding the execution of the authorizations and the production of the 
employment/medical records. The trial Court scheduled oral argument on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel. R. 169. 
A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Compel was held on May 22, 2009. R. 171. 
After reviewing the memoranda on the Motion to Compel and hearing oral argument from 
counsel for both parties, the Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered: 
1. Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return 
the signed authorizations to the Defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009. 
Defendant was specifically authorized to access any employment records with 
regards to plaintiff. R. 174 
2. Plaintiff was ordered to provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of 
every medical service which Plaintiff had received - including the date, 
medical provider, medical problem presented and medical service provided. 
Plaintiff was also ordered to designate which medical records plaintiff 
believed were not relevant to the case and, therefore, subject to privacy. R. 
175. 
3. Defendant was authorized to receive the medical records for those records for 
which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was 
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or 
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R. 
175 
4. If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested 
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation, 
Defendant would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the health care 
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by 
filing an appropriate motion with the trial Court. R. 175. 
x 
5. In the event Defendant filed the motion with the court seeking the medical 
records, Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which 
continuing privacy privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the 
trial court for in camera review. The trial court would then make a 
determination as to whether or not the records would be disclosed to 
Defendant. R. 175. 
On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion to Stay Order. R. 178. Plaintiff 
also filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 7, 2006, Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile 
accident (hereinafter the "Accident") in Cedar City, Utah. R. 3 - 8. 
2. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was a resident of Illinois, and not a 
resident of the state of Utah. R. 4. 
3. According to Plaintiffs settlement demand, when the accident occurred, 
Plaintiff was on her way to California to start a new job. R. 115. 
4. On October 4,2007, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, claiming personal 
injuries as a result of the Accident. R. 3 - 8. 
5. Plaintiff alleges she suffered injuries "including, but not limited to, injury to 
her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and injury to her 
upper and lower back and neck." Emphasis added. R. 6. 
6. Plaintiff alleges that she has "suffered great pain, emotional distress, loss of 
enjoyment of life", and claims she has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability 
with a whole body disability rating of 20%." R. 6 - 7. 
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7. Plaintiff claims that she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is 
unable to work at the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up. She claims that 
her neck pain interferes with her yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended 
periods of time. She claims she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up 
heavy objects. She claims she has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades 
which pain interferes with her yoga. She claims that she is unable to do push-ups. She 
alleges severe panic attacks and mood swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level she 
was accustomed to prior to the accident. R. 102. 
8. Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost 
wages, future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7. 
9. On or about January 14, 2008, Plaintiff filed Initial Disclosures, wherein Plaintiff 
referred to an "Independent Medical Evaluation" dated April 4, 2007 by Stuart W. King, 
M.D. in which Dr. King: 
• Referred to her past medical history, including "several sport related injuries" 
and "occasional back pain and some chiropractic treatment in the past before 
the accident;" 
• Reviewed her work in the past as "a professional dog walker;" 
• Opines that she will "require chronic pain management for the rest of her 
life;" and 
Assigned a whole person "impairment rating" to Plaintiff of 20%. 
R. 25-28. 
10. In the Initial Disclosures, Plaintiff referred to an Evaluation of Economic Losses 
submitted simultaneously herewith, from Dr. Paul H. Randle, wherein Dr. Randle: 
2 
• Estimated the "present value of the economic losses created as a result of 
Sabrina's injuries, not including statutory pre-judgment interest, is $724,016." 
• Refers to her "normal capacity to earn" as being equal to $17,060 per year; 
and 
• Makes other assumptions regarding her claimed lost wages and lost earning 
capacity. 
R. 25-28. 
11. On January 26, 2008, Defendants served Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents to Plaintiff, seeking (among other information) the identity of all 
health care providers who had rendered medical treatment to Plaintiff within twenty years 
of the accident. R. 34-37. 
12. Defendant served Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiff, seeking the identify of all employers which had employed Plaintiff within ten years 
of the accident. R. 34 - 37. 
13. On May 2, 2008, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories and First Request for Production of Documents. R. 38, 39. 
14. In response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 14 (requesting "the name and 
address of each medical provider...who has examined or treated [Plaintiff] during the past 
20 years [and]...the dates of treatment, the conditions or complaints that led to treatment, and 
the results of such treatment or examinations"), Plaintiff identified: 
Dr. D. Dettore, 6827 Stanley Ave, Berwyn, IL 60402. Primary physician for 
the past 25 years. Plaintiff generally experienced the cold and chronic ear 
aches; 
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Dr. Cecil Brown in Brookfield, IL. Chiropractic care in 1994 for sports 
related injury to Plaintiffs back; 
Planned Parenthood, 1000 E. Washington, Springfield, IL 62703. 
Gynecological care from 1999 to 2001; 
Women's Health Care Center, 3435 N. Sheffield, Chicago, IL, 60657. 
Gynecological care from 2002 to 2007; 
Woodbridge Health Center, 8580 Cinder Bed Road, Woodbridge, VA 22191. 
Obstetric care during pregnancy." R. 104. 
15. In response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 15 (requesting the name and 
address of each of Plaintiff s employers for the past 20 years, the hire and termination date 
for each employer, the nature of her duties performed, the name and address of each 
supervisor, her pay rate, and the reasons for termination), Plaintiff identified 25 employers; 
17 of which had employed Plaintiff since 2001. R. 104 - 105. 
16. On May 8, 2008, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiffs counsel containing 
authorizations for Plaintiffs medical and employment records. Defense counsel asked 
Plaintiffs counsel to have Plaintiff sign the authorizations and return them to defense 
counsel (since the health care providers and employers are not within the State of Utah and 
not subject to Utah subpoena). R. 110 - 111. 
17. Plaintiff did not provide any signed releases for her medical or employment 
records as requested by Defendants. R. 113. 
18. On May 14,2008, Plaintiff specifically declined to sign the authorizations for 
release of employment and medical records. R. 72. 
4 
19. In a May 21, 2008, letter, defense counsel again attempted to obtain signed 
authorizations for release of the records of the entities identified. R. 80-82. 
20. On August 15, 2008, due to Plaintiffs refusal to sign any of the 
authorizations, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel, requesting the trial court to order 
Plaintiff to sign the authorizations. R. 66-68. 
21. On December 8, 2008, oral argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel was 
scheduled by the trial court. R. 152. At that time, counsel for both parties presented a 
possible agreement to the trial Court whereby the parties would agree that, either the trial 
court or a third party (who was to be agreed upon by counsel) would review the 
medical/employment records to determine which records are relevant to the case. The 
parameters to determine relevance would be stipulated to by counsel. The parties also 
indicated that, if an agreement could not be reached on the various issues regarding the 
records, counsel could submit the Motion to Compel for a decision by the trial court or 
request a hearing. R. 158. 
22. After the December 8, 2008 hearing, the parties were unable to reach an 
agreement regarding execution of the authorizations and production of the identified 
employment/medical records. The court scheduled oral argument on Defendants' Motion to 
Compel on May 22, 2009. R. 169, 170. 
23. After considering the memoranda from the parties on Defendants' Motion to 
Compel and after oral argument, the trial court, Honorable G. Michael Westfall ordered: 
• Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return 
the signed authorizations to the Defendants . . . on or before June 22, 2009. 
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Defendant was authorized to access any employment records with regards to 
plaintiff. R. 174 
Plaintiff was ordered to provide the Court and Defendants a complete list of 
every medical service Plaintiff had received - including the date, medical 
provider, medical problem presented and medical service provided. Plaintiff 
was also ordered to designate which medical records plaintiff believed were 
not relevant to the case and, therefore, subject to privacy. R. 175. 
Defendant was authorized to receive the medical records for those records for 
which Plaintiff did not claim a continuing privacy privilege. Plaintiff was 
ordered to either disclose those specific records directly to Defendants or 
provide a signed authorization for the release of the records to Defendants. R. 
175 
If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege or claimed the requested 
medical records were irrelevant to the issues raised in the litigation, 
Defendant would have 30 days after receipt of the list of the health care 
providers to object to Plaintiffs claimed continuing privacy privilege, by 
filing an appropriate motion with the trial Court. R. 175. 
In the event Defendant filed the motion with the court seeking the records, 
Plaintiff would have 30 days to obtain the records to which continuing 
privacy privilege was claimed and to submit those records to the trial court for 
in camera review. The trial court would then make a determination as to 
whether or not the records would be disclosed to Defendant. 
R. 174, 175. 
24. Rather than comply with the trial court's Order, Plaintiff filed a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order. R. 185. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , allows a party to obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action. The documents sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the 
subject matter of Plaintiff s claims against Defendant. 
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By filing this personal injury lawsuit, and by asserting the claims she has, Plaintiff has 
placed m issue her health and employment status prior to the accident. The documents 
sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims which are in issue. 
Rule 506(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, establishes that no privilege exists against the 
disclosure of information communicated in confidence for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating a patient when the communication is relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element 
of any claim or defense. The information sought (employment/medical records pertaining 
to Plaintiffs employment and health status) is an element to the issues raised in Plaintiffs 
pleadings. 
The trial Court has broad discretionary authority to oversee discovery disputes in civil 
matters. The trial Court in this matter fulfilled its appropriate, discretionary function when 
it ordered Plaintiff to sign authorizations to allow Defendant to obtain her employment 
records from out-of-state former employers. 
The trial Court, in the exercise of its discretionary authority, appropriately ordered 
Plaintiff to disclose the identity of her prior health care providers, to provide a complete list 
of the medical services rendered to Plaintiff, to execute releases to allow Defendant to 
directly obtain her medical records from out-of-state health care providers and, if a 
continuing privacy privilege (or relevancy defense) claim was asserted, to identify such 




RULE 26(b), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ALLOWS A PARTY TO 
OBTAIN DISCOVERY REGARDING ANY MATTER, NOT PRIVILEGED, 
WHICH IS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER 
INVOLVED IN THE PENDING ACTION. 
Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates 
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or 
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought 
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
Modern rules of civil procedure are designed to facilitate fair trials with full disclosure 
of all relevant testimony and evidence. Roundv v. Staley. 1999 UT App 229, % 8, 984 P.2d 
404, (Utah App. 1999), certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271. Discovery rules are intended to 
make discovery procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any useless 
ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities and to remove elements of surprise or trickery. Ellis 
v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). Rules with respect to discovery must be applied 
with common sense and within reasonable bounds, consistent with its objective. State ex. 
rel. Road Commission v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1966). 
An attorney has a responsibility to use available discovery procedures to diligent 
represent his/her client and, in civil matters, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide the means 
to do this. Brown v. Glover. 2000 UT 89,1f30, 16 P.3d 540. 
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In this case, Plaintiff has filed her personal injury lawsuit claiming injury "including, 
but not limited to" injury to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, 
right foot, and injury to her upper and lower back and neck." Emphasis added. R. 6. She 
alleges she has sustained "suffered great pain, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life" 
and has suffered "permanent physical injury and disability with a whole body disability rating 
of 20%." R. 6 - 7. She claims that she suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, is 
unable to work at the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up, that her neck 
pain interferes with her yoga practice and flares up when she is sitting for extended periods 
of time, she is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up heavy objects, that she 
has pain and pinched nerves between her shoulder blades which pain interferes with her 
yoga, she is unable to do push-ups, and she experiences severe panic attacks and mood 
swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level she was accustomed to prior to the accident. 
R. 102. Plaintiff seeks damages for medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, 
future lost income, and loss of future earning capacity. R. 7. 
Faced with the claims asserted by Plaintiff, Defendants have sought to gather (among 
other things) the medical and employment records pertaining to Plaintiffs health and 
employment status prior to the accident. Plaintiff claims that her health was adversely 
affected by the accident and that she now has injury which did not exist before the accident. 
She claims she is unable to enjoy life as she did before the subject accident. She claims that 
her moods, her ability to deal with stress, her ability to function and her overall well-being 
is different that it was before the accident. 
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Rule 26(b)(1) allows a defendant to "obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." 
The term "relevant evidence" is defined in the Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence as: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Trial courts are given the duty of primarily dealing with parties and the discovery 
process "first-hand." Hales v. Oldrovd, 2000 UT App 76, % 15, 999 P.2d 588. Indeed, 
preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence 
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence "shall be determined by the court." See, Rule 
104, Utah Rules of Evidence. Consequently, trial courts have wide latitude in making 
evidentiary determinations of relevance, probativeness, and prejudice. Diversified Holdings 
L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, K 38, 63 P.3d 686. 
The standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is very low. Even evidence 
with the slightest probative value is relevant. See, for example, State v. Smedley, 2003 UT 
App. 7 9 , ! 15, 67 P.3d 1005; and State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8, «J 27, 994 P.2d 177. See also, 
Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402. 
Employment Records 
In the hearing held before Judge Westfall on May 22, 2009, exercising its judicial 
role, the trial Court ruled: 
First of all, with regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why 
the plaintiff - - why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever the 
defendant wants to spend the time looking for. They may very well be wasting 
their time, but it's their time they're wasting. 
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So, within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is required to execute a release 
that so the defendant can access any employment records that they want to 
access with regard to the plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when 
she was - - Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old. You're right, it 
may never come before the jury, but I don't know that until I see it. So that - -
you're required to that within 30 days, execute that release. They can access 
any healthcare - - or excuse me, any employment records they want. 
R. 233, p 12. 
The trial Court determined that, at least for purposes of discovery, the Defendants 
should be able to access Plaintiffs employment records. Plaintiff was ordered to execute 
releases and authorizations to allow Defendants to obtain those documents. 
The trial Court did not rule that the documents would necessarily be available to be 
used at trial ["It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible 
at trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence." Rule 26(b)(1)]. Rather, the trial Court properly ruled that Defendants 
should be entitled to receive and review the records because of the claims which had been 
placed in issue. Issues regarding her employment (length of employment, rates of pay, hours 
worked, duties required, duties performed, ability to perform as required, reasons for leaving, 
etc.) would certainly be relevant to the claims Plaintiff now asserts in her personal injury 
lawsuit, where she seeks damages for lost wages, future lost wages, and loss of future 
earning capacity. 
Medical Records 
With regard to the medical records, the Court took a different approach. Although 
recognizing the liberal discovery provisions of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure , 
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("parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action,") the trial Court expressed concern that some 
records may be "subject to plaintiffs privacy right1 and not disclosed." R. 233, pp. 12 - 13. 
During discovery, the trial Court issued its ruling that: 
I fully agree with the plaintiffs position that there may be records that are 
irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't know that until I see them. 
The defendant doesn't know what additional information they want - - may 
want to find, what additional discovery they might want to engage in until we 
find out what's there. 
The trial Court continued: 
I realize that the plaintiffs position is that all of this information should be 
filtered through the plaintiff, and I just disagree with that. I - - the plaintiff is 
not the appropriate - - plaintiffs Counsel is not the appropriate party to filter 
whether or not - - to provide the filtering process to determine whether 
evidence is or is not relevant. That's simply not the plaintiffs Counsel's 
prerogative. 
R. 233, p. 16. 
The issue the trial Court appropriately recognized was, in determining relevancy, is 
a Plaintiff entitled to unilaterally determine what records are "relevant" and what records are 
protected by "relevancy" or "privacy concerns." The trial Court's position is consistent with 
Utah law. 
In her brief, as she did in oral argument, Plaintiff continues to assert that she, rather 
than Defense counsel - or the trial Court - should determine, without independent review, 
which records are relevant to the issues she places in issue and which are not: 
1A discussion concerning the privilege which pertains to medical records will 
be considered hereinafter. 
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".. . where the vast majority of those records are not related to the condition 
at issue. . ." Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 1, Plaintiffs brief 
P. i 
• ". . . Plaintiff has already accurately and completely answered Defendants' 
formal discovery requests and supplied the information deemed relevant to 
such requests." Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 2, Appellant's 
brief, p. L 
• ". . . when the vast majority of the medical records are not relevant." 
Emphasis added. Statement of Issues, Issue 3, Plaintiff's brief, p. 1. 
• "The medical records now requested by Defendant are not related to the 
conditions at issue in this case." Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 14 
"The medical records requested by the Defendants are not related to the 
condition at issue. . . Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 14. 
• "The records are not 'related to the condition at issue/ and indeed are so 
unrelated that pursuit of the records is not even 'reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence'. . ." Emphasis added. Plaintiffs 
brief p. 17. 
• "The Plaintiff as the privilege holder, holds the right to determine what 
information is relevant and thus what information must be disclosed ." 
Emphasis added. Plaintiff s brief p. 21. 
"Where the Plaintiff has determined that certain sensitive medical 
information is not relevant to the formal discovery requests made by the 
Defendant... the Plaintiffs decision on the disclosure is final." Emphasis 
added. Plaintiff's brief p. 22. 
"The entire personnel file for all twenty-five (25) employers requested is not 
necessary for the proof of the case. If the employment records are relevant, 
they are [only] relevant as to Plaintiffs prior income and positions." 
Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief p. 26. 
• "The personnel files are not necessary" Emphasis added. Plaintiffs brief 
p. 26. 
Plaintiff misstates Utah law. 
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A determination of whether evidence is relevant requires a balancing of factors and 
appellate courts will reverse a trial court's determination only if a trial court abuses its 
discretion. Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 
P.2d 445, 454 (Utah App. 1994); and State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure discuss how claims of privilege (or claims that 
evidence is otherwise subject to protection) are to be handled - and who is to make the 
determination regarding the production of such documents. Rule 26(b)(6) states: 
Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise 
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to 
protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim 
expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or 
things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing 
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 
applicability of the privilege or protection. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs position (i.e., that Plaintiff unilaterally makes the determination 
as to what evidence is privileged, relevant, and subject to production or appropriately 
withheld), the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly and specifically require that information 
be produced "in a manner that.. . will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the 
privilege or protection." Rule 26(b)(6). 
This is precisely what the trial Court ordered in this case. The Court ordered that the 
medical records to which Plaintiff did not claim privilege, be presented to Defendant. If 
Plaintiff claimed privilege - or relevancy concerns - she was required to specifically provide 
sufficient information to allow others to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
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She was ordered to provide a list of the specific records to which the privilege was claimed 
and a basis for the claimed privilege. 
If, after reviewing the information, Defendant continued to believe the privilege did 
not exist and that a claim for protection from production was inappropriate, the documents 
would be submitted to the trial Court for in camera review to determine if the documents 
would, in fact, be privileged, irrelevant and or subject to production. 
Rather than provide appropriate explanation - other than the records are medical 
records and Plaintiff deems them irrelevant - Plaintiff refused to disclose the records2. 
Plaintiff relies on Sorenson v. Barbuto. 2008 UT 8,177 P.3d 614, for support that the 
medical records need not be provided. However, Sorenson clearly directs that Plaintiff is not 
in control of what records are to be produced to Defendant. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, \ 24 stated: 
Such information may be still be obtained through traditional forms of formal 
discovery. Our holding should not be construed as putting the patient in 
control of what medical information is made available to opposing counsel and 
what is kept private. Making this information available through formal 
methods of discovery strikes a balance between enabling the patient to protect 
confidential medical information that has no relevance to the civil action and 
providing the patient's adversary access to information that is relevant to a 
condition placed at issue in the case. 
2Plaintiff did indicate that the health care providers were a chiropractor (for 
sports injuries related to injury to Plaintiffs back), a primary physician (who she had seen 
over a 25 yearperiod), Planned Parenthood (for gynecological care), Women's Health Center 
(for gynecological care), and Woodbridge Health Center (for obstetric care). It should be 
pointed out that, even for Planned Parenthood, Women's Health Center, and Woodbridge 
Health Center, such records often contain significant information material to the claims 
asserted in a personal injury lawsuit. For example, generally women are asked to fill out a 
medical history, disclose medication which is being consumed, disclose complaints, disclose 
injuries, disclose on-going health issues and otherwise establish a base-line medical history. 
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The trial Court's order precisely complies with the procedural requirements of Rule 
26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the reasoning of Sorenson. The effect of the trial 
Court's order is to identify the requested documents in such a manner so as to allow 
Defendant to assess whether the privilege or protection would arguably apply. If there was 
still a dispute, the trial Court agreed to conduct in camera inspection of the 
requested/withheld records. Consistent with Rule 26, "other parties" (including the trial 
Court) are empowered to independently assess the applicability of the claim of privilege or 
protection, rather than simply rely on the information Plaintiff chooses to disclose. The 
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly support the procedure outlined by the trial Court. 
Plaintiff cites State v. Cardall 1999 UT 51, 1J30,972 P.2d 79, and State ex. rel. T.W.v 
State, 2006 UT App 259, U f 14-16,139 P.3d 312, for the proposition that, before documents 
are provided, Defendants must show with "reasonable certainty" that evidence favorable to 
their defenses exist - even before in camera review is allowed. 
It is important to note that both the Cardall and State ex. rel. T.W. v. State cases, supra 
were criminal matters, where the medical records sought were those of the victims of sexual 
crimes. In Cardall, the defendant sought to obtain a victim's psychological records. The 
Cardall court held in order for Defendant to obtain these records, it must be shown with 
"reasonable certainty" the records contain evidence favorable to the defense. At ^ 28-30. 
Likewise, State, ex. rel. T.W. v. State involved charges of unlawful sexual activity 
with a minor. The defendant in that case sought counseling records of the minor victim. The 
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court held the defendant did not present evidence sufficient to meet the "reasonable 
certainty" test. At ^ 14-16. 
In Cardall and State ex.rel. T.W.v. State the medical records being sought were of 
victims of crimes. Neither victim had brought suit, seeking damages, for the alleged wrongs. 
That is, neither victim had voluntarily placed their medical condition in issue. Rather, the 
State of Utah was prosecuting the alleged perpetrator of the crime, who wanted to review the 
medical records of the victims and place their medical condition in issue. These cases are 
significantly different from the personal injury lawsuit where a plaintiff places her own 
medical history in issue. 
Plaintiff also cites Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58, Tf 26, 999 P.2d 582, for the 
proposition that the "reasonable certainty" test should be required to determine if an in 
camera review of Plaintiffs medical records should be conducted to assess whether a 
privilege exists. However, theDebry case involved a divorce action (not a claim for personal 
injuries) in which the mental health of Mrs. Debry was put at issue by her husband. Mrs. 
Debry had not placed her mental condition in issue. She had not voluntarily waived her 
privilege by seeking damages for an alleged impairment to her medical health. 
Further, Debry, similar to the Sorenson case, dealt with a doctor who discussed his 
patient's confidential information and treatment with the opposing party in a lawsuit 
involving the patient. Debry actually stands for the proposition that when a patient's mental 
state is at issue in a lawsuit, the treating provider must at least notify the patient before 
discussing confidential patient information. As the Debry court stated: 
17 
The record before us does not demonstrate that any safeguards were used to 
protect Debry's confidentiality. From all that appears, Dr. Goates voluntarily 
furnished an affidavit about his patient's mental condition to her adversary in 
divorce litigation. Dr. Goates gave his affidavit without a court order, without 
a subpoena, and without even notifying Debry. She had no opportunity to 
assert her privilege. 
Debry at If 27. 
The Debry court further held: 
Before disclosing confidential patient records, or communications in a 
subsequent litigation, a physician or therapist should notify the patient. Even 
if the communications may fall into this exception to the privilege [referring 
to the exception which occurs when a patient's mental health or physical health 
is put at issue in a lawsuit], the patient has the right to be notified of the 
potential disclosure of confidential records. Such notice assures that the 
patient can pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid 
unnecessary disclosure. 
Debry at % 28. 
In the present case, Plaintiff has been given notice of Defendants' intent to obtain her 
medical records. In fact, it is Plaintiff who must sign the record releases to authorize 
disclosure of the records to Defendant. Further, the trial Court has already instituted 
safeguards in this case to avoid inappropriate disclosure - including, if required,//? camera. 
It should be noted that the proposed authorizations submitted to Plaintiff do not allow 
(and Defendants have never suggested) Plaintiffs health care providers to unilaterally 
discuss Plaintiffs complaints with Defendants. The authorizations simply allow "release [of] 
any and all protected health information records(s) concerning me as set forth in this 
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Authorization." R. 128. The authorizations do not provide Defendants with the right of ex 
parte communication beyond simply obtaining the records directly from the provider. 
If, after obtaining the medical records, additional information is required, it would be 
anticipated that further, formal discovery would be conducted - such as the scheduling of a 
deposition or other action - of which Plaintiff would be given notice and to which Plaintiff 
could, if appropriate, object. The trial Court would then have opportunity to determine if the 
further inquiry is appropriate. 
The documents sought here (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims 
and defenses asserted in this lawsuit. The documents are subject to production pursuant to 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Against the claim of privilege or other protection, 
the trial Court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in providing a mechanism 
whereby the rights of Plaintiff and Defendant would be protected. 
IL 
BY FILING THIS PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUIT, 
AND BY ASSERTING THE CLAIMS SHE HAS, 
PLAINTIFF HAS PLACED IN ISSUE HER HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT. 
By filing this personal injury lawsuit, and by asserting the claims she has, Plaintiff has 
placed in issue her health and employment status prior to the accident. The documents 
sought (employment/medical records) are relevant to the claims which are in issue. 
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Employment Records 
Plaintiff is claiming more than $724,000 in economic losses alleged as a result of the 
subject accident. Clearly, her prior earning history is relevant (and has been placed in issue) 
by asserting such claims. 
Plaintiff disclosed 25 prior employers; 17 since 2001 including: 
• Bar in Macomb, IL, 2001, cocktail server, Minimum wage plus tips; 
Methade, 2001, switchboard operator, Macomb, IL, $7 per hour; 
• Texas Roadhouse, Decature, IL, 2002, waitress, minimum plus tips; 
Stanley Plant, 2002, accounts receivable clerk $10 per hour; 
• Hooters Restaurant, Springfield, IL, 2003 to 2004, minimum rate plus 
tips; 
• Family Video, Springfield, IL, 2004, retail associate, $11 per hour; 
Olive Garden Restaurant, Springfield, IL, 2005 waitress, minimum 
wage plus tips; 
Olive Garden Restaurant, Downers Grove and Naperville, IL, 2005 to 
2006, minimum plus tips; 
• Dog walker, Chicago, IL, 2006, $10 per hour; 
Louisee's Tratorria, Studio City, CA, 2006, server, minimum plus tips; 
Real Estate assistant, Honolulu, HI, 2006 $10 per hour; 
• Olive Garden Restaurant, Naperville, IL., 2007, waitress, minimum 
plus tips; 
• Chicago Dog Duty, 2007, dog walker, $14 per hour; 
Rainforest Cafe, Gurnee, IL., 2007, waitress, minimum plus tips; 
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Sears, Fredericksburg, VA, 2008, cashier, $8 per hour; and 
Currently at GEICO Insurance, Fredericksburg, VA, Claims Adjuster, 
$14 per hour. 
R. 105 - 106. 
Obviously, from just reviewing the limited information provided, it is impossible to 
know the duties required by the job, the length of time employed at each employer, the 
number of hours worked, whether Plaintiff took time off work for health issues, the physical 
requirements of the job, the review of Plaintiff s performance, the income generated, and 
other job-related issues. Defendant has sought to gather the records from the employers to 
consider and review the information. Many of the jobs performed following the accident 
appear to be similar to those jobs which were performed prior to the accident. Certainly 
information maybe contained in the records which would help Defendants determine if there 
has been a change in Plaintiffs ability to perform her employment functions, as alleged. 
Receipt and review of the employment records is essential to Defendants' defense of 
Plaintiffs claims. 
Plaintiff has refused to execute any authorizations to obtain the requested information. 
Plaintiff has claimed $724,000 in economic damages - but is unwilling to allow Defendant 
to gather the information required to defend the claims. 
Plaintiff has placed her employment/work history in issue by presenting the claims she 
has. Obviously to defend these claims, it is important to gather the records to support and/or 
refute the claims asserted. 
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Medical Records 
The issue of prior personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff, the issue of her prior health 
(generally), the issue of medications she would have been on, the issue of her ability to do 
(or not do) certain tasks, the issue of limitations (if any) in her ability to pursue her activities 
of daily living, her prior chiropractic treatment, the issue of prior injuries, would clearly be 
relevant to the personal injury claims she is asserting from this accident. Under Rule 26(b), 
contemplates that, generally, such information should be disclosed. 
A number of courts have held the filing of a personal injury action waives the 
physician/patient privilege as to all information concerning the plaintiffs health and medical 
history relevant to the matters at issue. See, for example, Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted 
Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 1183, 1204 (Alaska 2009), rehearing denied, March 16, 2009. 
The Ayulek Court stated: 
[W]hen a plaintiffs medical privilege has been waived by the filing of suit, 
'discovery should normally proceed without judicial participation . . . in a 
manner demonstrating candor and common sense.'" Requiring a plaintiff to 
furnish medical releases to her adversaries is one way to accomplish that 
objective. Further, so doing as an alternative to requiring plaintiffs counsel 
to produce medical records can result in the discovery of records of which 
plaintiffs counsel is aware. It also eliminates requiring defendants to rely on 
plaintiffs counsel... "as the gatekeeper for the production of medical records 
that he considered relevant." 
Avuluk at 1204. See alsoArons v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831,837,338,9 N.Y.3d 393,409, 
850 N.Y.S.2d 345, 351, 352, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09309; and State ex. rel. McNutt v. Keet 
432 S.W.2d597, 601 (Mo. 1968)(holding plaintiff in personal injury suit waived physician-
patient privilege when filing suit and since defendants denied plaintiffs alleged injuries in 
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Answer to Complaint, plaintiffs health condition was a disputed issue. The court also held 
that a plaintiff should not be permitted to use privilege as both a "shield and a dagger" using 
the privilege to her benefit, but denying defendants access to her medical records). In 
discussing the policy reasons behind the waiver of the physician-patient privilege in a 
personal injury case, the Court of Appeals of New York stated: "This waiver is called for as 
a matter of basic fairness: "[A] party should not be permitted to affirmatively assert a medical 
condition in seeking damages ... while simultaneously relying on the confidential physician-
patient relationship as a sword to thwart the opposition in its efforts to uncover facts critical 
to disputing the party's claim" |YArons v. Jutkowitz. 880 N.E. 831, 837,838 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
2007), 9 N.Y.3d 393, 850 N.Y.S.2d 345, 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 09309 (citing Dillenbeck v. 
Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 287, 539 N.Y.S. 2d 707, 536 N.E. 2d 1126(1989)]. 
In Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3d 38, 48-49 (Montana 2004), the Montana Supreme 
Court reversed a trial court's decision to prevent the defendant from obtaining plaintiffs 
mental and medical health records. The plaintiff in that case argued that because she 
provided her doctors with complete copies of her disputed medical records, and her doctors 
stated the records showed no causal connection between any prior injury or condition and her 
current injuries, this ended the inquiry into whether the medical records should be produced. 
Plaintiff also argued that defendant should be denied access to the records because defendant 
did not present any expert medical opinion that plaintiffs alleged injuries were more 
probably than not caused by some other factor than her claimed cause of action. In rejecting 
this argument, the Henricksen court stated: 
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The fallacy in this argument is that there is no way that the State [defendant] 
could have provided this opinion because it was denied access to the very 
records which would have enabled it to make this determination. The [trial] 
court's denial of these records only allowed for one-sided view review of the 
medical records by ... [plaintiffs] physicians." 
Henricksen at 49; Emphasis in original. 
The Henricksen court opined "[Defendant]... was prejudiced when it was denied the 
right to defend itself in an informed manner. It had the right to discover evidence related to 
prior physical or mental conditions possibly connected to ...[plaintiffs] current damages." 
Judge Westfall correctly recognized this doctrine during the hearing on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel when he observed: 
I realize that Plaintiffs position is that all of this information should be filtered 
through the Plaintiff, and I just disagree with that. I - - the Plaintiff is not the 
appropriate - - Plaintiffs counsel is not the appropriate party to filter whether 
or not - - to provide the filtering process to determine whether evidence is or 
is not relevant. That's simply not the Plaintiffs counsel's prerogative. 
R. 233, p. 16. 
By filing her personal injury lawsuit, and claiming the injuries and damages she has, 
Plaintiff has placed in issue her medical and employment histories. The trial Court's order 
appropriately struck a balance between providing the records to Defendant while, at the same 
time, allowing the trial Court to determine if some, specific medical records would be 
protected from disclosure. 
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III. 
RULE 506, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, ESTABLISHES THAT 
NO PRIVILEGE EXISTS AGAINST THE DISCLOSURE OF THE 
HEALTH INFORMATION OF PLAINTIFF 
SINCE SHE HAS PLACED HER HEALTH STATUS IN ISSUE. 
Rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence, deals with Physician and mental Health Therapist-
Patient privileges. Generally, Rule 506(b) states: 
If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of 
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's 
life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) 
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental 
health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient, and 
(3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health 
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under 
the direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians 
or members of the patient's family who are present to further the interests of 
the patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
However, Rule 506(d), dealing with Exceptions, clearly provides: 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the 
patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim 
or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party 
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense. 
In this case, Plaintiff has claimed injuries "including, but not limited to, injury to her 
right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot and injury to her upper 
and lower back and neck." R. 6. In Answers to Interrogatory, she indicates: 
Plaintiff suffers chronic neck pain since the accident, and is unable to work at 
the computer for extended periods without pain flaring up. Neck pain 
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interferes with my yoga practice and flares up when sitting for extended 
periods and Plaintiff is unable to run for long distances and unable to pick up 
heavy objects. Pain and pinched nerves between shoulder blades interferes 
with yoga and Plaintiff is unable to do pushups or pickup heavy objects. 
Severe panic attacks, mood swings due to inability to teach yoga at the level 
Plaintiff was accustomed to prior to the accident. See also medical 
documentation provided in Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures. 
R.102. 
Plaintiff identified that she had seen a chiropractor for "sports related injury to 
Plaintiffs back" in 1994. R. 104. She disclosed other health care providers. R. 104. 
Plaintiff has placed her medical condition "in issue" in this law suit. She has placed 
in issue her ability to work, to sit, to run, to pick up objects, to do push ups, and has placed 
in issue her mental and emotional status. She has placed in issue her physical, mental and 
emotional status. 
Pursuant to Rule 506(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, there is no privilege when 
Plaintiffs health condition is an element of her claim and of the defense of the matter. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO 
OVERSEE DISCOVERY DISPUTES IN CIVIL MATTERS 
When disputes arise concerning discovery, trial courts are granted broad discretion 
regarding discovery matters. Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, % 8, footnote 1, 995 P.2d 
14; R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1999). The 
trial court has sufficient discretion, and wide latitude, to require discovery practices that are 
fair and effective in the circumstances of the pending controversy. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. 
of Oil Gas &Min.. 675 P.2d 1135.1144 (Utah 19831 In determining whether "good cause" 
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exists to require production of documents, the Utah Supreme Court has held "a wide latitude 
of discretion is necessarily vested in the trial judge." Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 
495 P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1972). 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the "purpose [of Utah's discovery rules] 
is to make procedure as simple and efficient as possible... and to remove elements of surprise 
or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as 
directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible." Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404, 407 (Utah 
App. 1999) quoting Ellis v. Gilbert. 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). 
As mentioned above, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empower the trial Court with 
the "gate-keeping" role in discovery disputes. The trial Court, in reviewing issues 
concerning relevancy and claimed privilege, is empowered to rule on these kind of disputes.3 
In fulfilling its duty in this case, the trial Court offered to conduct an in camera inspection 
of the records if Plaintiff and Defendants could not agree what records would be received. 
Even though Defendants claim that, by filing her lawsuit, Plaintiff placed her medical and 
employment history in issue, thus waiving her claim for privilege against disclosure of health 
care records, the Court agreed to conduct in camera review if necessary. Although such an 
in camera review is not necessary in these type of cases (since there is no privilege), 
appellate courts have recognized the propriety of such reviews in appropriate settings. 
3Defendant does not believe the trial Court should be required to review in 
camera all medical records in every personal injury case. Generally, having placed her health 
in issue (as discussed above), the privilege against disclosure is waived. However, if there 
is a specific, unusual, reason for claimed privacy or privilege, such specific, unusual requests 
may be considered by the trial Court. 
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In Cannon v. Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, 2005 UT App. 352,1f 21, 121 P.3d 
74, for example, the Utah Court of Appeals, held a trial court abused its discretion by ruling 
that a hospital's incident reports were protected by the "statutory care review privilege" 
without conducting an in camera inspection of the records. The Cannon court cited Benson 
v. IHC Hosps. Inc., 866 P.2d 537, (Utah 1993), in stating that in order to determine the 
applicability of the privilege [referring to the "statutory care review privilege"], it is 
"incumbent upon counsel to establish the evidentiary basis necessary for the trial court to 
make its determination of the issue of privilege." (citing Benson at 538) (emphasis in 
original). 
The Cannon court also cited Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 801 P.2d 912, 915 
(Utah 1990), in which the Utah Supreme Court was required to determine whether the 
"statutory 'official confidence' privilege" protected city police department personnel and 
internal affairs files from discovery. Madsen at 914. The parties inMadsen had reached a 
stipulation regarding the submission of the disputed materials to the trial court for an in 
camera review, but the trial court declined to make the review, ordered oral argument on the 
matter, and ruled whether the files were discoverable following the oral argument. Madsen 
at 914. On interlocutory appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial 
court partly because the trial court had ruled on the privilege issue solely based upon oral 
argument (and without an in camera review) from the parties as to why the privilege did not 
apply. See id The Cannon court further cited the Madsen court's reasoning that: 
[Wjhen statutory or common law privileges are "asserted in opposition to a 
request for discovery," trial courts "must make an independent determination 
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of the extent to which the privilege applies to the materials sought to be 
discovered," which determination "is the result of the ad hoc balancing of: (a) 
the discoverant's interest in the disclosure of the materials; and (b) the 
[information holder's] interests in their confidentiality." 
Cannon at f^ 17. 
The Cannon court further cited with approval the Madsen court's statement that "the 
party claiming a common law or statutory privilege must provide the trial court a 'specific 
designation and description' of each item of material for which the privilege is claimed, 'as 
well as the precise and certain reasons' for preserving the confidentiality of each item.'. . . 
Consequently, trial courts may properly reject a broad, non-particularized claim of the 
privilege." Cannon at f 17 (internal citations omitted). 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETIONARY 
AUTHORITY, APPROPRIATELY ORDERED PLAINTIFF TO DISCLOSE THE 
IDENTITY OF HER PRIOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, TO SPECIFICALLY 
ASSERT WHICH RECORDS (AND THE BASIS UPON WHICH) SHE CLAIMED 
PRIVILEGE, AND TO SUBMIT THOSE RECORDS FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW. 
In this case, Plaintiff filed her Complaint claiming injuries "including, but not limited 
to, injury to her right shoulder, left knee, left ankle, right ankle, right leg, right foot, and 
injury to her upper and lower back and neck." R. 6. She claims to have incurred medical 
expenses "and other special, miscellaneous and incidental damages in an amount to be 
proven to the Court." R. 6. She claims "great pain, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of 
life, and other general damages in an amount to be determined by the Court." R. 6 - 7. She 
claims "permanent physical injury and disability with a whole body disability rating of 20%" 
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R. 7. She claims lost wages, future lost income, and loss of future lost income, and loss of 
future earning capacity. R. 7. 
In attempting to gather information regarding Plaintiffs claimed injuries and 
damages, Defendant requested the names and addresses of all prior health care providers 
and/or employers. R. 71. Defendant served medical and employment authorizations to 
PlaintiffonoraboutMay8,2008. R. 71. Plaintiff refused to sign the authorizations. R. 72. 
When an impasse was reached concerning whether Defendants were entitled to gather the 
medical/employment records pertaining to Plaintiffs health/employment status prior to the 
accident, Defendants sought trial Court intervention to compel execution of the 
authorizations and to allow Defendants to obtain the records. 
The trial court used its sound discretion to grant Defendants' Motion to Compel and 
to order Plaintiff to provide to the court and Defendants a list of her medical providers as 
well as a summary of the dates she treated and the type of treatment rendered. However, the 
trial Court allowed Plaintiff to designate some records to which she did not claim a 
continuing privacy privilege, and to designate specific records to which she did claim a 
continuing privacy privilege. If Plaintiff claimed a continuing privacy privilege, the trial 
Court ordered Plaintiff to specifically identify those records and to identify the basis for the 
claim of continuing privacy privilege. If Defendants, after having received Plaintiffs 
identification of claimed privileged records, determined to continue to seek the records, 
Plaintiff would then be entitled to submit the records to which the claimed continuing privacy 
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privilege existed to the Court for in camera review to determine if such records would be 
produced, or would be protected. 
Clearly, the trial Court's order is within the discretion given to the trial Court. The 
trial Court has "built in" a way for Defendants to obtain the records which "are relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action," which "appear reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Rule 26(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, the trial Court "built in" a way for Plaintiff to object to the production of specific 
records, if there is a legitimate basis for the objection. 
Plaintiff claims that the trial Court's order should be reviewed for "correctness" and 
quotes Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 Utah 1996) for support. In fact, Askew supports 
an "abuse of discretion" standard. The Utah Supreme Court, in Askew stated: 
In reviewing the court of appeals decision, we must determine whether it 
correctly concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the 
documents in Hardman's insurance claim file were prepared in anticipation of 
litigation and thus were protected from discovery under rule 26(b)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State ex rel. Road Comm yn v. Petty, 17 Utah 
2d 382, 387, 412, P.2d 914, 918 (1966) (trial court granted discretion to 
determine whether interrogatories were subject to question under Utah's 
former work-product rule); see also UtahDepV ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 
P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995) (trial court granted broad discretion regarding discovery 
sanctions); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257,1266 
(Utah 1984) (same). Although trial courts have broad discretion in matters of 
discovery, the trial court, in exercising such discretion, must apply the correct 
law to its findings of fact, and its findings of fact must be supported by 
sufficient evidence. An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent 
an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the 
trial court's ruling. See, State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (while 
appellate courts always decide what the law is, deference maybe given to trial 
court's application of law to the facts); accord Brown v. Superior Court, 137 
Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725, 729-30 (1983) (trial court discretion in discovery 
matters "includes the right to decide controverted factual issues, to draw 
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inferences where conflicting inferences are possible and to weigh competing 
interests. It does not include the privilege of incorrect application of law or a 
decision predicated upon irrational basis.") Thus, we must first determine if 
the court of appeals correctly held that the trial court made an erroneous 
conclusion of law. 
At page 472. 
Here, the trial court did not make any "erroneous conclusion of law." The trial court 
established the procedure to be followed in obtaining the records - and established a "safe-
guard" in the event claimed privilege was asserted. However, no authorizations have been 
executed and no records have been obtained. Although the trial Court ordered that all 
employment record authorizations be executed, none have been. Although the trial Court 
ordered that all "non-contested" medical record authorizations be executed, none have been. 
Although the trial Court ordered that Plaintiff submit a list of medical record to which she 
claimed continuing privilege - and the basis for such claim - none have been. The trial Court 
was well within its sound discretion in ordering Plaintiff to execute the authorizations and 
to supply the records as ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully submit that: 
The trial court exercised sound discretion when it ruled that Defendants appropriately 
sought to obtain Plaintiffs medical and employment records to defend against claims seeking 
personal injury and lost wages. Plaintiff waived her privilege against disclosure by filing her 
personal injury lawsuit and placing in issue her health and employment status. 
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The trial Court, exercising sound judgment and discretion, established a procedure 
whereby concerns of continuing privilege maybe addressed; i.e., in camera review. Plaintiff 
does not have the unilateral right to determine what records are "relevant" or "privileged." 
Rather, in the face of the claim of privilege or relevance, the trial Court appropriately will 
make the appropriate determination. 
The trial Court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in ordering Plaintiff to 
sign releases authorizing Defendant to obtain medical and employment records, from out-of-
state employers and health care providers. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial Court 
be affirmed. The order of the trial Court compelling Plaintiff to execute appropriate releases 
and authorizations for employment and medical records from out-of-state 
employers/providers is appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this O day of April, 2010. 
LpWELL V.SMITH 
'RENT D. HOLGATI 
Attorneys for Respondent - Lynn 
Steadman and Steadman Land & 
Livestock, LLC 
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Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as 
otherwise stipulated or directed by order, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual 
likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all discoverable 
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the 
possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, 
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discoverable documents or 
other evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on 
the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under 
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a 
judgment which may be entered in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to 
satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(1) shall be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under 
subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being 
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably 
available and is not excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully 
completed the investigation of the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of 
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or 
less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an 
administrative agency; 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
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(a)(2)(A)(vi) in which any party not admitted to practice law in Utah is not represented by 
counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are 
subject to discovery under subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used 
at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving 
expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact 
discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or 
rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), 
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information 
regarding the evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of 
each witness, separately identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the 
party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by 
means of a deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the pertinent portions 
of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including 
summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and 
those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required 
by subdivision (a)(4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, 
unless a different time is specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list disclosing (i) 
any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made 
to the admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, 
other than objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be 
deemed waived unless excused by the court for good cause shown. 
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(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, all disclosures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and 
served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more 
of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written 
interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other 
property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests 
for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance 
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which 
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim 
or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be 
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources 
that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The 
party shall expressly make any claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, describing 
the source, the nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and 
any other information that will enable other parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the 
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is 
made, the court may order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good 
cause, considering the limitations of subsection (b)(3). The court may specify conditions for the 
discovery. 
(b)(3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in 
Subdivision (a)(6) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(b)(3)(A) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; 
(b)(3)(B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action 
to obtain the information sought; or 
(b)(3)(C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs 
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after 
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule, 
a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for 
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
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consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been 
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its 
subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain 
without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously 
made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order. The 
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed 
or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital 
of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(b)(5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(5)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose 
opinions may be presented at trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any 
deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(b)(5)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been 
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for 
trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or 
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party 
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(5)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(5)(C)(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a 
reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(5) of this rule; 
and 
(b)(5)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(A) of this rule the 
court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(5)(B) of this 
rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of 
the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions 
from the expert. 
(b)(6) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. 
(b)(6)(A) Information withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable 
under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation 
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the 
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the 
applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(b)(6)(B) Information produced. If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a 
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claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim 
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being 
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A 
receiving party may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a 
determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, 
it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the information 
until the claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is 
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court 
action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on 
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may 
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the 
following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had; 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a 
designation of the time or place; 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected 
by the party seeking discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited 
to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the 
court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in 
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such 
terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. 
The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2), 
except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have 
met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is 
filed. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the 
interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and 
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the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision 
(a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the 
disclosure or response to include information thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in 
the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under 
subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been 
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to 
testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty 
extends both to information contained in the report and to information provided through a 
deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, 
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some 
material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not 
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise 
stipulated or directed by order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in 
person or by telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to 
discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the disclosures 
required by subdivision (a)(1), to discuss any issues relating to preserving discoverable 
information and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiff's counsel shall schedule the 
meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good 
faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures 
under subdivision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) 
were made or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be 
completed, whether discovery should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should 
be limited to particular issues; 
(f)(2)(C) any issues relating to preservation, disclosure or discovery of electronically stored 
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; 
(f)(2)(D) any issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation 
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after production 
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order; 
(f)(2)(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these 
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rules, and what other limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(F) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating 
fault to a non-party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(G) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any 
event no more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in 
conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order shall also 
include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1)-(8), except that the date or dates for pretrial 
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be 
deferred until the close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a 
discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for entry 
of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject not 
included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under 
Rule 16(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery 
plan and discovery order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the 
discovery plan and order. The stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after 
joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every request for discovery 
or response or objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of 
record or by the party if the party is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The 
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has read the 
request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, 
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a 
request, response, or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf 
the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding 
in another state may take the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner 
and subject to the same conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp026.htrnl 4/2/2010 
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pending in this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of 
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person 
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters 
arising during the taking of such deposition which by the rules are required to be submitted to 
the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
disclosures or requests for discovery have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in 
Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed 
with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach 
to the motion a copy of the request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Lowell V. Smith, #3006 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
A Professional Corporation 
1218 East 7800 South, Suite 300 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801)562-5555 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SABRINA RAHOFY, an individual, : ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
: COMPEL 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : Civil No. 070500807 
LYNN STEADMAN, an individual, : Judge G. Michael Westfall 
and STEADMAN LAND & : 
LIVESTOCK, LLC, : 
Defendants. 
This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to Compel, 
and having reviewed the memoranda in the matter, and having heard arguments thereon, 
the Court finds and orders as follows: 
ORDER 
1. The Plaintiff shall execute authorizations for all employment records and return 
the signed authorizations to the Defendants by and through their counsel of record on or 
before June 22,2009. Defendants may access any employment records with regard to the 
plaintiff. 
JUN 1 ! 2009 
5th DISTRICT COURT 
JNTY 
. Deputy Clerk 
^ C O U N T V 
000174 
2. On or before June 22, 2009, the plaintiff is to provide to the Court and to the 
Defendants a complete list of every medical record the plaintiff has ever had generated on 
her behalf, including the date, medical provider, medical problem presented and medical 
service provided. The list provided to the Court and to the Defendants must be accurate, 
or the Court may impose sanctions. Plaintiff is to designate which of the medical records 
listed, plaintiff believes are not relevant to this case and therefore, subject to privacy. 
3. Defendants shall be entitled to receive medical records for those records to 
which Plaintiff does not claim a privacy privilege. Plaintiff is either to disclose those 
specific records directly to Defendants, or, if the Plaintiff does not have a copy of a specific 
record in her possession, Plaintiff is required to sign an authorization for release to release 
those specific records. 
4. Regarding Plaintiff's designation of health care providers which Plaintiff 
claims are privileged and irrelevant to the issues raised in this litigation, Defendants have 
30 days after receipt of the list of health care providers which Plaintiff claims are irrelevant 
and subject to privacy, to object to Plaintiff's designation by filing a motion with the Court. 
5. In the event that Defendants file a motion with the Court, Plaintiff will have 
an additional 30 days to obtain all such records from the various health care providers and 
submit all such records to the Court. The Court will review these records in camera, and 
make a determination as to whether or not they are to be disclosed. 
2 
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DATED this / / _ day of / ^ , , 2009. 
/ /BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
HONORABLE G. MICHAEL WESTFAT 
Fifth/dudicial District Court Judge 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
Jamis M. Gardner 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6/Z/0? 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this day of , 2009, to: 
Jamis M. Gardner 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
2500 N. University Ave. 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
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Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
May 22, 2009 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G WESTFALL 
Fifth District Court Judge 
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2500 N University Ave 
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Telephone (801)375-1920 
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( E l e c t r o n i c a l l y r e c o r d e d on May 
v r o a r t i s t h e m o t i o n 
l t t e r b e f o r e t h e Coar 
L y n n S t e a d m a n a n d 
n -70500807 Who d o we 
c a s e No u ' 
THE COURT T h e ma 
t o c o m p e l m t h e c a s e o f S a b r i n a R a h o f y v s 
S t e a d m a n L a n d a n d L i v e s t o c k , I n c 
h a v e a p p e a r i n g 9 
c t h f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s 
MR SMITH Y o u r H o n o r , L o w e l l S ro i t 
THE COURT O k a y 
t-hP p l a m t i f f 
us Gardner for the P 
THE COURT Okay I was hopino, ge 
could reach an agreeme 
MR GARDNER Jam] 
ntlemen, than we 
Apparently that 
nt with regard to this 
to rule on this 
hasn't happened The defendant has asked m 
f requested a hearing 
motion without a hearing, but the plami it 
m e that would 3usTiify 
So what else did the plaintiff want to tel 
everybody showing up here today, M r 
f e lt lake this was an 
MR GARDNER Your Honor, we just 
_.,
 privacy, and that the 
important issue related to the plaintiff s P 
, o f o l e the Court m 
1Ssues m this, we wanted to fully argue bet 
eSented That s why 
addition to 3ust what the pleadings ha.e pr 
f 1 1 v because of the privacy 
we felt like we wanted to aroue this tu y 
issues that are at risk 
h e medical records 
We have already provided all D 
t h a t reiate to the 
that we believe we have m our possession 
b eyond that We felt 
collision and what tney are asking for is 
„ u e with the Court 
n k e it was necessary to underline that xS 
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THE COURT: Okay. So what else do you want to present 
roe today -- to me today? 
MR. GARDNER: Well, your Honor, we just want to 
reiterate some of the facts that -- first of all, in their 
objection to the request for a hearing, they represent to the 
Court that our last offer -- or that our position was that we 
wanted the records to be sent to us first and then we would send 
them to them. What we had thought we had agreed to at the last 
hearing was that we would — the records would be sent to your 
Honor or a third party, and they would decide what was relevant, 
and then they' d send those to the defendant. So it wasn't like 
we were just withholding that. 
So in their objection they've either misunderstood what 
we thought we had agreed to or mischaracterized that agreement. 
So we just wanted to clarify that we believed the context of this 
is crucial in that the case law that they have cited in Jackson 
v. Kennecott, there are four factors that they must show, and 
they fail the first three. They have failed to show that these 
documents are relevant. They have failed to show that they are 
m our possession, and they've failed to show that they are 
relevant to the case 
We've already — like I said, we've provided them 
what -- everything we believe to be related to the collision, and 
if they need to go a few years back, that's normally what we do 
in these cases What they've asked for is gynecological records 
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fiorn when she was 19-years-old How is that relevant to her 
accident and some injury -- left wrist injuries and some back 
injuries That's not relevant That's not important to this 
case How is it relevant that when she was 16 she worked at 
McDonald's7 Why do they need personnel files or those records to 
determine whether or not as a 31-year-old she is now competent or 
whatever as the -- m the real estate profession and needs that 
information to go forward 
So the case that they have cited, they have failed it 
I believe, your Honor, that the most important factor is that, 
yoa know, this is a type of issue that has already come before a 
district court, and unfortunately the judge who had it the first 
time around didn't have the opportunity of prior existing case 
law, and so that got appealed 
We don't need to go through that process because the 
Supreme Court j.n 2008 just reviewed this issue They said m the 
Barbuto case -- Sorensen v Barbuto, 2008, "Rule 506(d)(1) does 
not mean that the patient has consented to the disclosure of his 
entire medical history Rule 506 is only broad enough to allow 
the disclosure of information relevant to an element of any claim 
or defense Therefore, it is a limited waiver of privilege, 
confined to court proceedings, and restricted to the treatment 
related to the condition at issue ' 
So this is an issue that's already been decidea for 
your Honor, and the Supreme Court has gone over it with specific 
-5 
reference to these type of medical requests that are beyond 
what has been asked for They didn't -- the defendants haven't 
actually made that clear m their memorandums because they've 
]ust -- memoranda They've said, "We've requested these records 
they didn't give them to us " Well, we gave them everything we 
believe to be relevant, but now they want more than that 
That is where that limit of waiver of privilege applies 
So we believe that our client does not need to be subjected to 
her medical records being reviewed by defendants simply because 
she filed a lav;suit related to an accident Why her gynecologica 
records or obstetric records, or why she -- when she had a cold 
when she was nine, how that is relevant to this case 
THE COURT Okay All right What else do you ^ant'to 
bring to my attention9 
MR GARDNER Just that your Honor an State vs. 
Cardall, the last -- the last point I'd like to make, in State 
v Cardall, if they make a general request, which they've made 
here, ]ust a general request for the records from these doctors, 
they -- the plaintiff still holds the privilege She gets to 
make that decision wnether those are going to be released, if 
they're not related to the treatment, the condition at issue 
So she has made the decision, and as Counsel we've consulted on 
that, and that's -- the decision is final, according to the Utah 
Supreme Court in 1999 That decision is final 
Now if they can -- if they -- it says, "Unless defense 
Counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was 
withheld and brings it to the attention of the Court, the 
decision is final " Now if they make specific requests, then the 
case law suggests that we give it to the Court, the Court reviews 
it in camera and then gives it to the defense That's what we 
offered, which that's -- we don't believe they're entitled to 
that, because they haven't made a specific request, but we were 
willing to provide that, even though it wasn't a specific 
reque st 
Based on what they're asking, it's a general request, 
and that's the point So the -- when they first sent us these 
requests for authorization, it related to the employment records 
going back to when she was 16 Tom Seller, who is with our 
office, and he's been on the board of governors right now with 
the UAJ, the Utah Association for Justice which was the Utah 
Trial Lawyer's Association When we received those he sent a 
letter and said, "Can you point me to a statute or a case law 
that you believe entitles you to that information, because I've 
never seen that, and I'd like to look at that and know why it is 
you believe you're entitled to employment records related to a 
car accioent " 
You know we've given them ta< returns We can look for 
W-2's if we haven't alreadv given these and provide what we need 
to, bat the case law m Utan is specific already in this — on 
this case It's already been decided So we believe it should 
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be an easy decision for the Court because it can look at the 
precedents m this Utah court and not need to worry about later 
appeals because the Court's already decided this issue 
In their reply memorandum, the defendants raise this 
issue of good cause, that we have failed to provide good cause 
for why we didn't provide these documents First of all, privacy 
is always a good cause Second of all, they've just tnen 
attempted to shift the burden 
We don't have that burden They've not cited a single 
case that mentions the words "good cause " They have the burden 
to show that the documents are relevant, m our possession and 
necessary to the case, according to their own case law they've
 n 
cited, and that's just the generic case law, let alone the 
specific case law on records related to privilege that are a 
limited privilege, and our client has not released that 
privilege 
So your Honor, we would ask that the Court deny the 
motion, that we not be forced to sign these author1zarions for 
release If the Couit does feel like the defendant is entitled 
to some of these records, we would still ask that they be 
submitted to the Court for m camera review, ana then the defense 
can have whatever you believe to be relevant 
THE COURT Thank you Mr Smith, do you want to 
respond 0 
MR SMITH I would, your Honor Thank you very rpjch 
for taring the time to hear us today In a letter from 
Mr Gardner dated February Stb, 2009, heie's the way he 
interpreted the Court's order last time we met "Plaintiff will 
submit the authorizations to the respective employers and direct 
that the employers provide the employment records to Counsel for 
plaintiff Plaintiff will submit the authorizations to the 
respective medical provider, and direct the medical provider 
provide the medical records to Counsel for the plaintiff 
Plaintiff will review tne records and provide ihose records to 
defendants, which plaintiff believes to be reasonably likely to 
lead to discoveraole evidence " 
We don't believe that the medial records should be 
filtered through the plaintiff's office, and that he should have 
the oppoitunity of deciding unilaterally what's relevant and 
what's not relevant 
When we were here before, we indicated that we would 
request the records, we would get them, but before we would use 
them 1 n a hearing or a p r o c e e d m q we wculd try and agree upon 
whether or not they were relevant If we could not agree then 
those records woula be presented to the Court We did not 
dnticipate, and we did not expect the 30b to be transferred to 
the Court to receive all the medical records and go through and 
rev lew those 
We're officers of the Court We're ret going to 
distribute these records all over We re going to taKe a look at 
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the records that are there to determine whether they're relevant 
or not 
Let me just address the relevancy matter In their 
answers to irterrogatorles, they identified five healthcare 
providers that were out of state For one of those, a Dr Brown, 
they specifically referred to the fact that he treated her for 
a sports related injury to plaintiff's back In this case, 
plaintiff is claiming injury to her shoulder, knee, ankle, upper 
and lower back We're clearly entitled to get these records to 
determine what her condition was like before the accident, what 
injuries were caused by the accident, and what the residuals have 
been after 
When we were here before we talked about the medical 
records, and we agreed that we would not seek the McDonald's 
records, nor the records when she was dog walkmq, but all of the 
other authorizations would be executed We would receive those 
records again, to determine what her claim for lost wages is 
Now it's important to note that of the 25 employers that 
she identified m her answers to interrogatories, she's had 17 
employers since 2001 That clearly would be relevant about an 
earning histoid what kind of job she had, why she was employed, 
why she was let go, why she changed employment 
This is a personal injury action where she has placed 
her health in issue, and she's made a claim for lost wages where 
she has put m issue her earning and her earning capacity 
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Normally we would subpoena those records, but the scope 
of the subpoena does not go out of the state So typically in 
these kind of cases we have the plaintiff execute releases and 
authorizations, we then obtain those records 
This case has been pending since -- the accident 
happened August 7th, 2005 Suit was filed October 2nd, 2007, 
and we have been trying since we filed our answer to gather 
this information so we could move this matter forward We have 
prepared the case management order, which then has fallen off 
track because we've had these discover/ disputes 
We would recommend to the Court that the Court issue its 
order that the plaintiff execute the releases and authorizations, 
that those records come to us We' re happy to provide an exact 
copy of everything we get to Mr Seller and Mr Gardner If we 
can't agree on how those records are going to be used at trial or 
in motions or in other discovery efforts, at that point we could 
involve the Court to look at the relevancy We're clearly 
entitled to gather the records We're entitled to review them 
in order the evaluate the claims 
I think this is a -- and part of the reason we asked 
that we not come down for a hearing was because we thought we 
had resolved all these issues before, and maybe there was just 
a misunderstanding as to how tne Court was going to rule But 
we're happy to be here, and I'm happy to answer any questions, if 
the Court has any 
- 1 1 -
THE COURT Okay Thank you 
MP SMITH Thank you 
THE COURT It isn't your motion You're defending the 
motion, bat I let you speak first Is there anything else you 
want to bring to my attention'? 
MR GARDNER Your Honor, if the requests had been 
specified -- you know, Mr Smith brings up the back doctor It 
was 11 years prior to the accident, but arguably I can see the 
argument for why that particular record might be relevant But 
they presented all of these, 25 employers and five doctors --
McDonald's included, dog walking, and gynecological records 
So it wasn't -- they didn't ask us to go through and 
tell us which ones we would sign They said, "Sign these 25, 
sign these five " So we've had to defend against all 30 of these 
authorizations for release If they had limited it or we -- to 
the back doctor or the recent real estate professional that she's 
m , maybe we can reach an agreement, but when it's all 30, and 
we've already provided them the information of wages, employment, 
position, they can use that information to present to the jury, 
"Look, she's been employed at 17 different places since she 
was — since 2001 " They can depose her about why sn.e wasn't 
there or why she left 
The personnel files from all those people are not 
relevant, and there s no statute or law that says they're 
entitled to all those personnel records when we re dealing with 
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a per -- a car accident and her future loss of earning In all 
tnese cases -- we did tax returns and w-2's, and then the experts 
argue about how much she could make So we've had to defend 
against all of these because that's the request that -was made 
to us -- or rather, the demand So based on that, we've had to 
defend against this 
THE COURT All right Thank you First of all, with 
regard to the employment records, I can't see any reason why the 
plaintiff -- why the defendant shouldn't have access to whatever 
the defendant wants to spend the time looking for They may very 
well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting 
So within 30 days of today's date the plaintiff is 
required to execute a release so the defendant can access any 
employment records that they want to access with regard to the 
plaintiff back to when she was selling cookies when she was --
Girl Scout cookies when she was nine-years-old You're right, it 
may never come before the jury, but 3 don't know that until I see 
it So that -- you're required to do that within 30 days, 
execute that release They can accesb any healthcare -- or 
excuse me any employment records they want 
With regard to the medical care records, this is what 
I m q o m g to rule Within 30 days the plaintiff is to provide to 
the Court and to the defendant a corrplete list of every meaical 
record the plaintiff has ever had generated on her behalf with 
the date, the doctor ard the medica, problem that was presented, 
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and the service that was provided Yon don't have to go into any 
detail, but just that much information 
Then within -- also within that 30 days, the plaintiff 
is required to designate which of those records the plaintiff 
believes are not relevant to the case, and therefore should be 
subject to the plaintiff's privacy right and not disclosed Any 
other records not so designated are either to be disclosed, or 
if the plaintiff doesn't have the copy of the record m their 
possession, and you know, they simply gather the information by 
calling and talking to the healthcare provider, then they are 
to -- the plaintiff is required to sign a release to release 
those recoros — those specific records 
With regard to the items that are in the list that 
the plaintiff claims should not be disclosed, the defendant 
then has 30 days thereafter to file a motion with the Court to 
review those records and decide whether or not they're relevant 
Then if that motion is filed, then the plaintiff has the 
responsibility to gather all of those records, and the plaintiff 
has a responsibility to have those records available so that I 
can review tnern 
I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there 
may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, 
but I don t know that until I see them The defendant doesn't 
know vhat additional information they want -- may want to find, 
what additional discovery they might want to engage I n until we 
-14-
find out what's there 
I'm going to throw the onus of the burden back on the 
plaintiff with regard to those medical records, and require that 
the plaintiff gather the information, submit the information, 
and then with regard to those records that they don't want to 
produce, gather the records, m the event the defendant then 
files a request that any of those specific records be disclosed 
Do both Counsel understand my order? 
MR SMITH I think we -- I do, your Honor 
MR GARDNER I think so, your Honor Just for 
clarification, those five medical providers, we don't have any 
of their records right now So for her to -- she's just going 
to have to go from her memory and call them, like you say So 
she's -- I'm just saying --
THE COURT You have 30 days to provide the list of 
every visit, and as I indicated -- what was it, every visit, 
the date of every visit, the medical problem that was presented 
and the service that was provided, without going into any detail 
That may very well require that she admit that she had 
hemorrhoids and went to a doctor for it, but that's where we're 
at I don't -- if there were disclosures made, obviously we 
don't make -- we're not going to get into those disclosures at 
this point 
Then once you provide that list, then the burden shifts 
to the defendant to go through that list and say, NNI want -- I 
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believe that this record is something the Juage should looK at," 
and then they designate those records They have 30 days to do 
chat Once those are presented to you, then -- and a motion is 
filed, then you -- I'm going to give you an additional 30 days to 
gather the records and provide them to the Court and then I will 
look at them m camera and make a determination as to whether or 
not they ought to be disclosed 
MR GARDNER I ]ust wanted to confirm that, m that 30 
days, I don't think it's reasonable that we'll be able to get the 
actual records, but she's going to do her best to provide them 
THE COURT Yeah, you have 90 days, essentially, to get 
the records, if my math is right You have 30 days to designate 
the records -- well, and then they have 30 days to designate 
which ones they want you to -- that they think that should be 
pro -- they think should be produced that you don't want to 
produce, and I guess they could do that m five days if they 
want But then you have from that time -- that notice is 
provided, you have an additional 30 days to gather dll of those 
records and submit them to the Court 
MR GARDNER I ]ust mean in that f u s t 30 ddys 
THE COURT Right No, I understand 
MR GARDNER It will be based on what 5he can remember 
THE COURT Yeah, you'll have at least 6C days to gather 
whatever records need to be presented to me so I can determine 
whetner they should be presented to the -- producea to the 
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defendant 
MR SMITH Your Honor, I understand it's ]ust not what 
she can remember She has to take some affirmative action to 
contact the doctors and find out what those --
THE COURT That's correct That is -- it's her 
responsibility Since she wants to protect that privacy 
interest, and we don't know, you don't know, I don't know if 
there really is a privacy interest to be protected, she has the 
burden of gathering that information and providing it If she 
doesn't, then I may very well impose some sanctions, which could 
be fairly serious m this case 
I realize that the plaintiff 5 position is that all 
of this information should be filtered through the plaintiff, 
and I lust disagree with that I -- the plaintiff is not the 
appropriate -- plaintiff's Counsel is not the appropriate party 
to filter whether or not -- to provide the filtering process to 
determine whether evidence is or is not relevant That's simply 
not the plaintiff's Counsel's prerogative 
MR GARDNER I just want to -- just trying to clarify 
to that first 30-day list may not be based on actual records, but 
will be based on her homework that she's doing to get that list 
aid calling the doctors, but I don't know that we'll be able to 
get the actual records for that first 30-day list 
THE COUPT Well, and if I -- and I'm not saying that 
you have to have the actual records, but the information that you 
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provide better be accurate, because if it's not, then I may very 
well impose some sanctions because 1 -~ this has been going on 
long enough I'd hoped that you'd be able to resolve it This 
essentially stalls the case You know, I'd like to see this 
issue get resolved 
Mr Smith, can you prepare an order for my signature9 
MR SMITH Thank you, your Honor I will 
THE COURT All right I hope that I've made it clear 
enough Let me see if there is anything else 
MR SMITH May I suggest to the Court that we may 
need to submit an amended case management order, but we'll work 
together to prepare that 
THE COURT See if you can work that out All right 
Thanx you 
MR SMITH Thank you very much 
THE COURT That's all m that matter, and that 
concludes the matters on the Court's 9 o'clock calendar 
MR SMITH Have a nice weekend your Honor 
THE COURT Thank you 
(Hearing concluded) 
Tab 4 
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Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions As used in this rule 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any 
state 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any 
state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, advanced practice 
registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that 
person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addition 
(b) General rule of privilege If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating 
the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) 
information obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental 
health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or 
mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the 
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis 
and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. 
The person who was the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have 
authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense As to a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or 
emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after 
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for 
mental illness, if the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in 
need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered 
examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless the court in 
ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
24-8(4) and 58-25a-8 There is no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of Rule 501, marriage and family therapists are not 
covered by this Rule 
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 and Rule 506 are as follows: 
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, it being the opinion of the Committee that 
full disclosure of information by a patient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be encouraged as in the 
"physician" patient setting. The Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 further apply to licensed clinical social 
workers To meet this request, the Committee included such individuals within the definition of psychotherapists Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social work "means the application of an established body of knowledge and 
professional skills in the practice of psychotherapy. . ." Section 58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage in the 
practice of clinical social work unless that person: (1) is licensed under this chapter as a certified social worker," has the 
requisite experience, and has passed an examination. Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for "clinical social 
worker[s]." As a result of including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-10 in 
total for all social workers. 
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to civil cases. The Committee was of 
the opinion that the considerations supporting the privilege apply in both. 
(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, the proposed Rule 506 granted protection only 
to confidential communications, but did not extend the privilege to observations made, diagnosis or treatment by the 
physician/psychotherapist. The Committee was of the opinion that while the traditional protection of the privilege should 
extend to confidential communications, as is the case in other traditional privileges, the interests of society in discovering 
the truth during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests in extending the protection to observations made, 
diagnosis or treatment. However, the Supreme Court requested that the scope of the privilege be broadened to include 
information obtained by the physician or psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment, whether obtained verbally 
from the patient or through the physician's or psychotherapist's observation or examination of the patient. The Court further 
requested that the privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and advice. To meet these requests, the Committee relied in 
part on language from the California evidentiary privileges involving physicians and psychotherapists. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 
992 and 1012. These features of the rule appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The Committee also relied on language 
from Uniform Rule of Evidence 503. 
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Upon the death of the patient, the privilege ceases to exist. 
The privilege extends to communications to the physician or psychotherapist from other persons who are acting in the 
interest of the patient, such as family members or others who may be consulted for information needed to help the patient. 
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or 
psychotherapist. For example, a certified social worker practicing under the supervision of a clinical social worker would be 
included. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the 
physician or psychotherapist or others who were properly involved or others who overheard, without the knowledge of the 
patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the concept that 
in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the exception in 
terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the common law concepts of 
"waiver." 
The Committee did not intend this rule to limit or conflict with the health care data statutes listed in the Committee Note to 
Rule 501. 
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child abuse reporting requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et 
seq. 
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted during the 1994 Legislative General 
Session that changed the licensure requirements for certain mental health professionals. The rule now covers 
communications with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis of mental or emotional 
conditions, specifically certified social workers, marriage and family therapists, specially designated advanced practice 
registered nurses and professional counselors. 
Some mental health therapists use the term "client" rather than "patient," but for simplicity this rule uses only "patient." 
The committee also combined the definition of confidential communication and the general rule section, but no particular 
substantive change was intended by the reorganization. 
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Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the 
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of 
Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. 
Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an accused is a 
witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-
examination as to other issues in the case 
(e) Weight and credibility This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to 
weight or credibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This provision is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable to Rule 8, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) Rule 104(c) 
recognizes that hearings on motions to suppress confessions should be conducted out of the hearing of the jury where there 
is a contested issue. State v. Allen, 29 Utah 2d 88, 505 P.2d 302 (1973). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
Cf. Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S. Ct. 192, 19 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1967). 
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Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." 
Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme 
Court State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution 
of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word "statute" the words 
"Constitution of the United States" have been added. 
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